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Jewish Power in America: Myth and Reality. By Henry L. Feingold. New Brunswick:
Transaction Publishers, 2008. xiv + 164 pp.

In 2007, Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer published The Israel
Lobby, claiming that the American Israel Public Affairs Committee
(AIPAC) and its neoconservative allies were misshaping American foreign
policy in accordance with Israeli interests. In Jewish Power in America,
Henry L. Feingold, an elder statesman among historians of the American
Jewish experience, offers a counter-polemic. He identifies the belief in
American Jews’ outsized influence with the age-old antisemitic conspiracy
theory that Jews constitute a demonic cabal. Through case studies of
American Jews’ historical attempts to exercise political power, Feingold
demonstrates that the conspiracy theory misunderstands the nature of
Jews’ power and the extent of their influence. He argues that American
Jews have been able, to a limited extent, to exercise “ideational” or
“soft” power—basically, moral suasion carried out through effective
organization and public relations campaigns. Yet their soft power has
succeeded only when there has been a “confluence of interests” between
Jewish goals and American national priorities (36). Where such a confluence did not exist, American Jews’ best efforts have failed to gain their
political ends.
American Jews have succeeded at times in influencing the political
process, he argues, because they have mastered the skills of democratic
organizing, training generations of activists coming up through the intricate system of communal affairs. Groups like the National Conference
for Soviet Jewry (NCSJ) were successful, for example, in convincing the
American people that the right of Soviet Jews to emigrate would be a
key sign of the success of American Cold War politics, consonant with
the nation’s values and interests. This public relations success enabled
NCSJ to work with Richard Perle, a member of Senator Henry Jackson’s
staff and a key figure among the neoconservatives, to draft and gain
support for the Jackson-Vanik amendment linking Jewish emigration to
the U.S.S.R.’s obtaining Most Favored Nation trade status.
Influence depends on confluence. Hence, American Jews’ success is
conditional. Despite some Jews’ high profile positions in the Roosevelt
administration and the community’s disproportionate support for the
social welfare state—called by antisemitic wags at the time the “Jew
Deal”—Jews’ soft power was ineffective during World War II in persuading Roosevelt to enter the war earlier to stop the Holocaust. Roosevelt
did not believe most Americans would see intervening in Europe to save

Book Reviews 379

Jews as a reason to go to war. Even during the Soviet Jewry campaign,
American Jews’ influence was limited; during the Nixon administration,
Henry Kissinger argued that pressing the U.S.S.R. on Jews’ human rights
interfered with the détente policy. Again, while the Israel lobby has used
the American political process effectively to advocate for aid, political
cover, and weaponry, it has never been as effective as the exaggerated
narrative suggests. Jews were unable to prevent the sale of AWACs
technology to Saudi Arabia or Hawk missiles to Jordan or to convince
the U.S. to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital (73). Feingold points
to recent flare-ups between US and Israeli officials with regard to the
war in Iraq (Israelis thought the focus should have been on Iran) and
the West Bank settlements to suggest that the alliance of mutual interests
is not unassailable.
Even the Jews’ most successful projections of their interests on the
national stage do not signify the kind of unity that the myth of hyper
Jewish power imagines. Feingold calls attention to Jews’ internal factionalism due to the varying aims of the alphabet soup of organizations. He
explains that during the Soviet emigration debacle, the Israeli government
clashed with American Jewish agencies like the Joint Distribution Committee over the question of whether Soviet Jews should be compelled to
immigrate to Israel or be permitted to “drop out” of aliyah and immigrate
to the U.S. Feingold points out that no organization can be considered
the representative voice of American Jewry. Whether the group is AIPAC,
the American Jewish Committee, or the Conference of the Presidents of
Major American Jewish Organizations, the mandate of their leaders is
only to speak for their group’s interests. President Roosevelt may have
called Rabbi Stephen Wise the Jewish pope, but Feingold makes clear
that the United Jewish Communities’ slogan “We Are One” has become
mere fodder for intracommunal jokes.
If even the avowedly Jewish organizations do not present a unified
front, Feingold asks, how is it possible to see more general political
movements like the New Left and the neoconservative movement as
Jewish? He points out that most Jews in these movements have had only
vague affiliations, if any, with Jewish ideology or organization. Moreover,
he claims that to identify Jewish power with either radicalism or neoconservatism is misleading because both of these political movements
are more extreme than the majority of American Jews, who hew to a
position “slightly left of center” (86).
Feingold offers no social-scientific evidence to support this claim, in
keeping with the sparse scholarly apparatus of the book as a whole—one
of the indications that the book aims to reach beyond the academy. The
tone also suggests a broader aim and personal investment. The chapters
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on the New Left and the neoconservatives sometimes speak of Jews in the
first person plural, rather than the third person typical of historical studies, and veer toward sarcasm, as if to imply that Feingold does not want
middle-of-the-road liberal Jews to be tarred with the extremist brush.
The book has one conceptual limitation: it does not posit a satisfying historical explanation for the theory of inordinate American Jewish
power. Feingold argues that the source of this theory “remains a mystery
whose roots may lie in prehistoric myths and fears,” as exemplified by
the ancient deicide charge, and the myth of the Elders of Zion (117).
Yet identifying the recent animus against the Israel lobby with a primeval antisemitism obscures the motivation of those groups who express
it, such as the anti-Zionist coalition in the international community, or
the activists and scholars whose sympathy with the Palestinian cause
sometimes leads to knee-jerk anti-Zionism, or those who see Israel as an
obstacle to peace. Where the stakes are so high, it is no great mystery
why some members of these groups have adopted a spurious explanation.
They will use any means to discredit current Jewish political aims. One
does not expect a historian to resort to a “prehistoric” theory of Jew
hatred. Feingold needs only to correct the record, as he does splendidly
in this important book.
Michael Galchinsky
Georgia State University

Race and Religion among the Chosen Peoples of Crown Heights. By Henry Goldschmidt.
New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2006. xi + 281 pp.

This sometimes gripping ethnography begins with a wonderful vignette
about misunderstanding between blacks and Jews—“intimate strangers”—in a hot, sweltering laundromat in Crown Heights, Brooklyn (6).
The rest of the book unpacks how these two groups, Lubavitch Hasidim
and mainly West Indians, who clashed so violently in 1991, make sense
of their differences. Whiteness in Crown Heights, unlike elsewhere in
the United States, is uniquely Jewish. But the Jews of Crown Heights
see themselves as Jews, not whites. For them, the neighborhood consists of besieged Jews living amid aggressive Gentiles. Yet West Indians
recognize a different neighborhood: disempowered blacks segregated
from privileged whites. This difference, argues Goldschmidt, makes a
difference. The thesis of the book is that Crown Height disrupts any
simplistic or essentialized classifications of sameness and difference in
contemporary America.

